Incentivicing doctors to take the costs of treatment into account in their prescription decision could lead to lower health care expenditures and higher welfare. This paper shows that also the 
Introduction
It is well known that insurance creates moral hazard: In the health sector, insured people would like to have more expensive treatments than socially optimal. On the other hand, treatments are normally prescribed by doctors. If doctors took the costs of treatment into account in their treatment decision, equilibrium because of the misalignment of interests, i.e. less information is transmitted from patient to doctor. It is shown that this communication eect can make a system without cost incentives preferable from a social welfare point of view. If the patient's collaboration is hardly needed, a system with cost incentives is preferable. For example, a doctor can easily establish that a patient has a broken leg by having an X-ray. The symptoms reported by the patient are less important in this case.
If, on the other hand, an illness might have a psychological background, the patient's collaboration is essential and a system without cost incentives might be preferable.
The main idea of the paper is a tradeo between having the best information to base the decision on and having the socially best decision rule. A related tradeo is known in organization theory. Alonso et al. (2008) ask how much autonomy division managers should have. Giving division managers more autonomy results in better information use in decision making but less coordination across divisions. In my paper, the only way to get better information (from the patient) is a socially less desirable decision rule for the doctor. In both papers, there is a tradeo between the quality of information and the quality of the decision rule (for a given information structure). The downside of an informed decision in Alonso et al. (2008) is a lack of coordination while in my paper it will be the neglect of costs. A major technical dierence between the papers is that division managers (headquarters manager) have full (no) information in Alonso et al. (2008) while doctor and patient will both receive a noisy signal in my model. This setup seems to be closer to reality in the health sector.
From a technical point of view the paper contributes to the cheap talk literature following the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Their model is extended in de Barreda (2010) to a setup where the decision maker receives a noisy signal. My paper generalizes further by substituting the perfect information on the sender/expert/patient side by a noisy signal. This paper complements existing literature on the design of health care systems. Early contributions as Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968) already point out the moral hazard caused by health insurance:
Insured patients might overconsume treatment from a social welfare perspective because they are insured. Ma and McGuire (1997) introduce the physician as an additional player and analyze contractual diculties in the health market. In particular, health outcome and doctor's eort are non-contractible and even the quantity of care consumed can be subject to misreporting. Ma and McGuire (1997) analyze how these contractual constraints inuence optimal contracts between insurance and patient as well as between insurance and physician. My paper focuses on a dierent kind of constraint, i.e. a constraint in information transmission arising in the communication between doctor and patient.
It will be shown that the necessity of information transmission between patient and doctor might constrain the power of the incentive scheme oered to the doctor.
Obviously related is the literature on physician compensation and managed care. In his survey Glied (2000) mentions two problems of supply-side cost sharing, i.e. cost incentives for physicians:
(i) underprovision of necessary services and (ii) strong incentives to avoid costly cases. In this context my paper adds a third problem: Hampered information transmission between doctor and patient.
Furthermore, my paper provides one possible explanation for the ambiguous cost eect of managed care mentioned in Glied (2000) .
The medical literature contains statements like payment arrangements could signicantly undermine patients' beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents (Mechanic and Schlesinger, 1996) and emphasizes that there should be no conict of interest between patient and doctor (Emanuel and Dubler, 1995) . Kao et al. (1998) nd that patients trust their physician less if the physician is capitated than when he is payed on a fee for service basis. Physicians are also less satised with their relationships with capitated patients compared to their average patient (Kerr et al., 1997) . My paper contributes by formalizing why trust, interpreted as shared objectives, is vital for the patient-physician relationship. Such a formalization is interesting for two reasons: First, it allows for both costs (less trust) and benets (less overtreatment) of cost incentives. Second, one can obtain results concerning the optimal design of health care systems, i.e. where in the health system are aligned interests especially important and where could cost incentives improve welfare.
The next section introduces the model and is followed by a simple numerical example. This example illustrates the main points. Section 4 analyzes a general model and answers the question: When do cost incentives work? The nal section concludes by discussing certain assumptions and pointing out testable predictions as well as possible applications in dierent areas.
Formal setting
Patient and doctor have a common prior F over the set of all possible health states of the patient. The set of health states is denoted by Θ. A health state can be interpreted either as the severity of a given disease or as a set containing dierent diseases. The patient receives a private signal σ p ∈ Σ p about his health state. In practice this signal can be interpreted as the symptoms a patient can report to his doctor or as the intensity of his symptoms. The doctor receives also a private signal σ d ∈ Σ d about the patient's health. This signal can be interpreted as the result of the doctor's examination, e.g. his interpretation of an X-ray photograph or listening to the patient's heartbeat. Given the health state, there is a distribution G(σ p , σ d |θ) of signals which is common knowledge. Put dierently, G(σ p , σ d |θ)
gives the probabilities that a patient (doctor) receives signal σ p (σ d ) given a health state θ.
The timing is the following: First, the patient's health state is determined by nature. This health state is unknown to doctor and patient. Second, doctor and patient receive their signals σ = (σ p , σ d ) which correspond to the true health state through G. Third, the patient can send a message, e.g. communicating his signal, to the doctor. Fourth, the doctor determines a treatment τ from a set of available treatments. The costs of the treatment c(τ ) are paid for by the patient's insurance.
Utility of the patient depends only on his true health state θ ∈ Θ and the treatment τ . In particular, a patient's well being does in the end not depend on the signals. For the doctor, I look at two scenarios: Either the doctor has no cost incentives which means that he makes his treatment decision to maximize the patient's utility or he is cost sensitive (or has cost incentives) with which I mean that he maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is the patient's utility minus costs. The perspective of the paper is therefore eventually the perspective of a (benevolent) designer of the health system, e.g. a government or an insurance plan, who has to determine which kind of incentives he gives to the doctor.
A simple example
This section deals with a small numerical example which illustrates that cost incentives can lead to lower welfare. Take Θ = {A, B, C} and Σ p = Σ d = {0, 1}. In words, there are three diseases called A, B and C. One can interpret health states either as similar illnesses or as levels of severity of the same illness. Doctor and patient will each receive one of two possible signals which are denoted by 0 and 1. For example, the patient's signal could be whether he feels no/little pain or strong pain while the doctor's signal could be whether the patient's heartbeat is unusual or not. The prior F is given by disease A and B occurring with probability 2/5 each and disease C with probability 1/5. The distribution G is given in the following table: To illustrate: A patient with disease A receiving treatment a has a utility of 8. Treatment a costs 5. Therefore, welfare would be 8 − 5 = 3 in this situation.
One interpretation is that disease C is being healthy and treatment c is the option no treatment. Treatment b is a very eective but also very expensive treatment while a is not so eective but substantially cheaper. A quick calculation shows that treatment a is welfare maximizing where welfare is dened by patient utility minus costs. The same is true for b in health state B and c in C.
No cost incentives
If the doctor has no cost incentives, the incentives of doctor and patient are aligned. The patient will therefore communicate his true signal σ p in equilibrium. 6 Just to illustrate: The rst term is the probability of being in state A and receiving the signal (0, 0), i.e. 2/5 * 4/5, multiplied with the utility of the resulting treatment b in state A, i.e. 10, minus the costs of this treatment, i.e. 8.
probability to disease A and B. Therefore, the optimal treatment is b. If σ d = 1, he assigns probability 2/9 to disease A, 2/9 to disease B and 5/9 to disease C. It is straightforward to calculate that in this case the optimal treatment is c.
In principle, there could be two kinds of equilibrium: First, a separating equilibrium in which the patient truthfully reports his signal to the doctor, i.e. the two signals are separated. Second, a pooling equilibrium in which the patient sends the same message regardless of his signal.
Suppose there is a separating equilibrium, i.e. the patient communicates his signal σ p truthfully to the doctor in equilibrium. The doctor will then implement the welfare maximizing treatment knowing both signals. If σ p = 0, the patient expectsgiven his signalto get a utility of u truth = 8/13 * 8 + 5/13 * 10 = 114/13. 7 If however the patient lied and communicated σ p = 1, the doctor would implement treatment b and the patient's expected utility would be u lie = 8/13 * 10 + 5/13 * 9 = 125/13. 7 Given σ p = 0, the patient assigns probability 8/13 to health state A with signal σ = (0, 0) which leads to treatment a. With the counter probability 5/13, he expects state C with signal σ = (0, 1) and treatment c.
Variation II: Increasing costs
The negative information eect of cost incentives can be so strong that costs can be higher under cost incentives. To see this, change the example above by changing the ex ante probability of disease C from 1/5 to p c < 1/5 and assign the ex ante probability (1 − p c )/2 to sickness A and B. Note that this does not change decisions without cost incentives as it is always perfectly known whether one is in state C or not.
If, however, p c is small enough and the doctor knows only his own signal, he will prescribe treatment b instead of treatment c when he receives signal σ d = 1. This inevitably leads to higher costs than without cost incentives: Now b is always prescribed while c was prescribed without cost incentives for signal σ = (0, 1). Note that a lower p c will make the incentive constraint of a separating equilibrium even tougher, i.e. reducing p c does not lead to a separating equilibrium. It turns out that in the example expected costs are higher with cost incentives if p c < 2/41.
This result is slightly reminiscent of the empirical results concerning the cost eects of managed care. One feature of many managed care plans are cost incentives for doctors, e.g. capitation payment.
As Glied (2000) reports in his survey, results on the cost eect of managed care are however inconclusive:
Some studies report higher costs, some report lower costs or no cost dierence between managed care and traditional care plans.
Model and results
This section uses a more general model to analyze the setting and eect described before. There are two reasons why this is desirable: First, one has to verify that the eects described above are not due to the discrete nature of the example. Second, this will allow to determine under which circumstances cost incentives are welfare maximizing and therefore have implications for the optimal design of a health care system. The patient's message in the example above is cheap talk: The message itself does not have direct payo implications. Only the treatment decision is relevant for the patient's utility and welfare. The canonical model for cheap talk games is Crawford and Sobel (1982) . To t the health sector, the information structure of Crawford and Sobel (1982) has to be amended as described below.
I assume that health state θ is a real number from some bounded interval and also σ p , σ d and τ are assumed to be real numbers. Given his signal σ d and the message he receives from the patient, the doctor updates his beliefs about the health state of the patient θ and chooses his preferred treatment. For simplicity, I assume that 
form an equilibrium if:
and F (θ) conditional on observing σ p and using Bayes' rule. 10 9 For notational convenience q(m|σ p ) is a probability density function but mass points can be easily accommodated. 10 Note that the patient takes expectations not only over the health state but also over the doctor's signal because σ 
In words, the rst condition says that the patient reports with positive probability only signals maximizing his utility given the strategy of the doctor. The second condition establishes that the doctor uses an optimal strategy given the patient's equilibrium behavior. Put dierently, beliefs about the true health state do not change too sharply if the patient's signal changes marginally. Note that slightly irregular distribution, e.g. with mass points at a healthy state θ = 0, can be allowed. Assumption 1 simplies the analysis by ensuring that the doctor's treatment decision is dierentiable in the patient's signal.
The game is then similar to the information transmission model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) with three additional twists: First, the doctor (receiver in the language of Crawford and Sobel) receives a signal while he is completely ignorant in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Second, the patient (sender) does not know the state of the world. Instead he has a noisy signal. Third, the divergence of interests between doctor (receiver) and patient (sender) is not xed but depends on the treatment (decision).
The following proposition extends results from Crawford and Sobel (1982) to this more general setting. Proposition 1. With cost incentives, there exists no separating equilibrium. There exist partitioning equilibria on the range of σ p . Each part of this partition has a minimum length κ which is bounded away from zero. If Σ p is bounded, the number of parts in the partition is bounded from above.
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is the following: In equilibrium a patient cannot tell his true signal to the doctor.
If he did, the doctor would prescribe a treatment that is too cheap from the patient's point of view (as he does not care about costs). Hence, the patient would have an incentive to overstate his signal.
will inuence the doctor's treatment decision.
In practice, this would mean to claim additional symptoms or to overstate the intensity of existing symptoms. What happens in equilibrium is that the patient's signal range is partitioned and the patient reports in which part of the partition his signal lies. The doctor does not know the precise signal of the patient but gets a rough idea which he takes into consideration when choosing the treatment. Because of the partitioning, a patient can no longer overstate his signal a little bit. If the patient deviated by reporting a higher part of the partition, he would get a substantially higher treatment. In equilibrium he will not deviate because he expects this treatment to be too high. In practice one could interpret this in the following two ways: First, a patient does not want to report symptoms that are too much dierent from the real ones as this could mislead the doctor, i.e. result in treating the wrong illness.
Second, extreme overstatement of symptoms could result in too strong medication with severe side eects. Hence, the patient does not want to overstate his existing symptoms too much.
It is also clear that the partition cannot be arbitrarily ne: If the parts are too small, then overstating one's signal a little bit is again possible. This explains the minimum length statement in the proposition. The minimum part length immediately implies that the number of parts is bounded if the interval from which patient signals are drawn is bounded.
The mechanism through which cost incentives can harm welfare is the same as in the example of section 3: If the objectives of doctor and patient are dierent, the patient has an incentive to use his information strategically to get the more expensive treatment he wants. In equilibrium, the doctor will have less information (partitioning of signal range) compared to the situation without cost incentives. Consequently, he is more prone to make inappropriate treatment decisions. In short, there are two eects when introducing cost incentives: First, costs are taken into account which, ceteris paribus, decreases costs and increases welfare. Put dierently, the doctor stops prescribing excessively expensive treatments. Second, communication and therefore the information of the doctor is worse.
Hence, treatment decisions are less accurate which reduces welfare. Whether the cost or the information eect dominates is ex ante unclear. The following propositions show that in two extreme cases the cost eect dominates and therefore cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives.
Proposition 2. Welfare is higher with cost incentives if the doctor's signal is suciently informative. That is, given G(σ p , σ d |θ), there exists an ε > 0 such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if the doctor's signal is drawn from εG(σ p , σ d |θ) + (1 − ε)1 θ where 1 θ is a distribution putting all probability mass on θ. Cost incentives lead also to higher welfare if the patient's signal is suciently uninformative, i.e. for ε > 0 small enough if the patient's signal is drawn from εG(σ p , σ d |θ) + (1 − ε)U θ where U θ is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] .
Proof. see appendix This result is intuitive: If the doctor is able to determine the patient's health state almost on his own, i.e. without knowing the patient's signal, then the patient's signal is useless. Therefore, the information eect of introducing cost incentives is small while the cost eect is still there.
One interpretation of proposition 2 is that cost incentives become eventually more attractive with medical progress. This holds at least true if medical progress implies better diagnosis possibilities for doctors. Consequently, one might then expect to see more cost incentive elements in health care systems over time.
A second interpretation is that some specialists optimally should have cost incentives while others should not. A radiologist or a trauma surgeon will normally base his decisions on his own examination and less on the patient's report.
11 This might be less true for an internist or a general practitioner.
A related third interpretation is that an optimal health care system should incorporate selective cost incentives. More precisely, cost incentives should be applied for the treatment of diseases where the doctor's information is relatively more important than the patient's information.
Proposition 3. Cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if social and private objectives dier suciently. That is, for any given information structure and cost function c(τ ) there exists an α > 0 such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost function αc(τ ).
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is that the cost eect will become dominant if (marginal) costs are high enough.
Consequently, the information loss due to cost incentives is negligible compared to the cost eect.
In line with previous interpretations cost incentives are especially useful for specialists dealing with high cost treatments on a regular basis. Also diseases involving high cost treatment on a regular basis are especially well suited for cost incentives.
The previous propositions illustrate when cost incentives are superior to no cost incentives. To conclude this section, I want to give an example where no cost incentives are superior to cost incentives.
In fact, I can use the same example as Crawford and Sobel (1982) which is attractive for two reasons: First, it is very simple and allows therefore for an analytical solution. Second, it has been used repeatedly in the cheap talk literature and has become a benchmark example there.
Example. Health states are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . The patient has perfect knowledge of the health state while the doctor's signal is completely uninformative. Assume that the patient's utility function is a quadratic loss function, i.e. u(θ, τ ) = −(θ − τ ) 2 , and that the cost function is linear in 11 Another example of this category is the veterinarian or to quote Will Rogers: The best doctor in the world is the veterinarian. He can't ask his patients what is the matter-he's got to just know. treatment, i.e. c(τ ) = ατ . Given the information that σ p (which is now the true health state) is in the interval (s 1 , s 2 ), the optimal treatment decision for a doctor with cost incentives is τ = s 1 +s 2 −α 2
. With α = 1/10 the model is mathematically equivalent to the example in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . It is shown there that the nest possible equilibrium partition is (0, 2/15, 7/15, 1), i.e. a patient will report whether his signal is in [0, 2/15) or in [2/15, 7/15) or in [7/15, 1] . Utility of a patient with state θ in [0, 2/15) is given by −(1/60 − θ) 2 , with θ ∈ (2/15, 7/15) utility is −(1/4 − θ) 2 and with θ ∈ (7/15, 1) utility is −(41/60 − θ) 2 . Expected consumer utility in this partition equilibrium is therefore Hence expected welfare is −0.01058 − 0.045 = −0.05558. Note that this is an upper bound on welfare:
Of course, there are also equilibria with partitions consisting of only two parts or one part. It is easy to check that these equilibria result in lower welfare.
Without cost incentives the patient will truthfully reveal his signal and therefore communicate the true health state to the doctor. Consequently, τ = θ and consumer welfare is 0. Expected costs are 1 10 0.5 = 0.05 which results in expected welfare of −0.05. Therefore, no cost incentives lead to higher welfare than cost incentives.
Discussion and conclusion
Introducing cost incentives for doctors turns out to be a double edged sword: On the one hand, taking costs into consideration should avoid the prescription of too expensive treatments. On the other hand, misalignment of patient's and doctor's incentives will hamper communication between the two: The patient has an incentive to exaggerate and in equilibrium this leads to signal bunching. Consequently, the doctor has worse information and is less likely to assess the patient's health state correctly. Knowing about the uncertainty he might even choose more expensive treatments to be on the safe side. In a numerical example, this can lead to higher costs than under no cost incentives (see section 3).
If costs are very high or if the doctor is able to assess the health state very accurately given only his signal, cost incentives are the welfare maximizing policy. This shows that an optimal health care system will use dierent degrees of cost incentives in dierent circumstances. In practice, cost incentives could dier across diseases and across specialists.
Although the model is stylized, it allows to formalize the idea that trust is important in the patient-doctor relationship. A lack of trust reduces the quality of communication and eventually the quality of the doctor's diagnosis. This eect could constrain contracting between insurances and doctors.
Note that some seemingly strong assumptions are actually not very restrictive: The concentration on two extreme cases where the doctor either maximizes patient utility or total welfare is obviously not realistic. The main eect, that diverging objectives lead to worse communication, however, holds true whenever the doctor cares more about costs than the patient. By the same argument, it is not restrictive to assume full indemnity insurance: The main point is that the patient does not bear the full social costs which is a feature of any form of insurance. The results do therefore not depend on a specic form of insurance. One can interpret the costs c(τ ) simply as the part of treatment costs paid by the patient's health insurance.
In some sense, the model is a best case scenario for the benevolent designer: He can freely set the doctor's incentives without incurring any costs. In practice setting up an incentive scheme for doctors might actually be costly. Doctors might also not respond immediately because of previously formed habits. It is therefore even more remarkable that the designer might not want to give cost incentives to the doctor.
The model gives several testable predictions. Quality of diagnosis should decrease after an introduction of cost incentives for doctors. Such a quality decrease could be reected in the data in dierent ways: First, therapies could be changed more often (if the doctor realizes the error at a later stage).
Second, patients with a given diagnosis-treatment pair will be treated less successfully (e.g. take longer to recover) because some receive the wrong treatment due to a wrong diagnosis. These eects should be more pronounced for specialists and diseases where patient input is vital for the diagnosis. If trust reects the willingness to communicate, one should expect patient's trust in their doctor to be lower when their doctor has cost incentives. This last result is indeed conrmed by the health literature, see for example Kao et al. (1998) .
More abstract, a welfare maximizing sponsor (say a benevolent government) might prefer a decision maker (doctor) who shares his preferences not with the sponsor but with the patient. In a broader context an agent might benet from surrendering his interests when information provision by another party is important. This could have applications in other contexts like mediation: A mediator with decision power who shares the interests of another party might be preferable to making the decision oneself.
In general, shared objectives proof to be vital for information provision. Patient advocacy can therefore be seen as an institutional response to the importance of information provision by patients.
Consequently, one might expect similar institutions to emerge whenever information provision by aected parties is vital. In this context, the relationship between a lawyer and his client could serve as an additional example.
Third, in a hypothetical separating equilibrium the patient attains a higher utility by misrepresenting slightly upwards as the doctor will increase his decision uniformly continuously in σ p . The implicit function theorem gives for a hypothetical separating equilibrium
The denominator is obviously positive as it is (−1) times the second order condition of the doctor's maximization problem. The numerator is positive as well because of stochastic dominance: As −u (θ − τ ) is a strictly increasing function of θ, we have 14 By uniform continuity, misrepresentation can be chosen small enough to prevent an overreaction by the doctor.
Consequently, there cannot be a separating equilibrium. The same argument shows that also locally, i.e. on some subinterval of the patient's signal range, there cannot be a perfect separation of types, i.e. patient signals have to be bunched in equilibrium.
Fourth, in a partition equilibrium communicating a higher partition will result in a higher treatment decision. This follows from the fact that higher signals σ p indicate higher health states θ and the doctor's optimal treatment decision is increasing in θ. Formally speaking, H(θ|(s 1 , s 2 ), σ d ) rst order
Fifth, in a partition equilibrium there exists a minimum partition length κ > 0. It was shown earlier that the optimal treatment decision of a doctor is uniform continuous in σ p (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Therefore, there exists a κ > 0 such that optimal treatment decisions dier by less than b for all σ p and σ p with |σ p − σ p | < κ (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Now suppose by way of contradiction that there was a partition (s 0 , s 1 ) with s 1 − s 0 < κ. By the denition of κ and b, a patient with signal σ p = s 0 will (in expectation) strictly prefer the cost sensitive doctor's separating treatment decision for type σ p = s 1 to the separating treatment decision for type σ p = s 0 .
By concavity of u(·), he will also prefer a cost sensitive doctor's separating treatment decision for all types σ p ∈ (s 0 , s 1 ) to his own. By continuity, the same holds for patients with a signal s 0 − ε for some ε > 0 small enough. Clearly, a cost sensitive doctor receiving the message (s 0 , s 1 ) will assign a 14 To be precise, this follows as the treatment range is bounded by τ and 1. On this closed and bounded treatment range the maximum of the second derivative exists and constitutes the bound away from 0. treatment between the optimal separating treatment for σ p = s 0 and for σ p = s 1 . Therefore, a patient with signal s 0 − ε will prefer the message (s 0 , s 1 ) to any message m ⊂ [0, s 0 ].
Step ve and the boundedness of the patient's signal range imply that the number of partitions in any partition equilibrium is bounded.
A one-part-partition equilibrium (babbling equilibrium) in which all σ p are pooled exists always.
This proves existence of partition equilibria.
Proof of proposition 2: Denote the doctor's beliefs over states θ (derived by Bayes' rule) given a signal drawn from εG(σ p , σ d |θ) + (1 − ε)1 θ by k(θ, ε|σ d ). Note that these beliefs are continuous in ε. For ε = 0, the doctor has full information and therefore the welfare maximum is attained with cost incentives. As c (τ ) > 0, decisions under no cost incentives dier from decisions with cost incentives.
Consequently, welfare with cost incentives is strictly higher than without cost incentives if ε = 0.
As beliefs (and therefore treatment decisions and welfare) are continuous in ε, the rst part of the proposition follows.
For the second part, note that H(θ|σ p , σ d ) does not depend on σ p if ε = 0. Consequently, no information is lost when switching to cost incentives. Taking costs into account makes cost incentives strictly superior as c (τ ) > 0. By continuity of H(θ|σ p , σ d ) in ε, the same conclusion holds for ε > 0 small enough. whenever H(0|σ p , σ d ) < 1. Consequently, welfare is lower without cost incentives compared to the simple policy τ = 0 (regardless of the signal) under cost function αc(τ ). A cost sensitive doctor will improve on this simple policy by using the information he has, i.e. σ d . Consequently, cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost function αc(τ ).
